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I.

INTRODUCTION

Much is expected of the modern corporation. Shareholders seeking to
maximize their return on investment pay close attention to reported
earnings and stock price appreciation. 1 Unanticipated negative movements
in these variables can give rise to shareholder agitation, amplified by hedge
funds and activist pension funds. 2 Although this is characteristic of the
Anglo-American ‘market for corporate control,’ these types of pressures
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1. See John R. Graham et al., The Economic Implications of Corporate Financial
Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 13 (2005) (“CFOs state that earnings are the most
important financial metric to external constituents.”).
2. See TESSA HEBB, NO SMALL CHANGE: PENSION FUNDS AND CORPORATE
ENGAGEMENT 1-2 (2008) (discussing the role of pension funds and institutional investors).
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have also been brought to bear on large continental European companies
even though nation-state rules and regulations governing stakeholders’
relationships have been slow to embrace shareholder rights. 3 The
European Union (hereinafter “EU”) has sought to modernize member
states’ corporate law, responding, in part, to the reliance of member states
on domiciled companies for long-term economic growth in the face of
heightened global competition for market position and the integration of
financial markets.
Community activists and some types of institutional investors have
encouraged traded firms to respond to global challenges such as climate
change and the welfare of employees and service providers in distant
lands. 4 For many activists these issues are about ethics and moral
responsibility, given the enormous power of large corporations when
compared to the majority of national governments. For some institutional
investors, especially those with legal obligations regarding the long-term
welfare of beneficiaries, short-term shareholder value is balanced against
the long-term growth and development of whole economies. 5 In these
cases, fiduciaries are self-conscious about the time horizon over which they
reap value from investment; even if not intended, the largest of institutional
investors have a stake in the long-term structure and performance of global
markets. 6
Whether corporations have any obligation other than making a
profit—the limit of corporate social responsibility associated with Milton
Friedman’s dictum proclaimed at the height of the Cold War—is subject to
considerable debate. 7 For much of continental Europe, the corporation is
3. See Rob Bauer et al., The Emerging Market for European Corporate Governance:
The Relationship Between Governance and Capital Expenditures, 1997-2005, 8 J. ECON.
GEOGRAPHY 441, 463 (2008) (“[P]ortfolio investors are able to exert pressure on the
managers of large [European] firms to act in ways consistent with shareholder value rather
than stakeholder value . . . .”).
4. See Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Why Should They Care? The Role of
Institutional Investors for Corporate Global Responsibility, 37 ENVTL. PLAN. 2015, 2028
(2005) (showing how institutional investors may encourage companies to adopt higher
environmental standards).
5. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Do the Fiduciary Duties of Pension Funds Hinder
Socially Responsible Investment?, 22 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 145, 145-69 (2007)
(examining and questioning the existence of the apparent dichotomy between fiduciary
responsibility and socially responsible investment).
6. See JAMES P. HAWLEY & ANDREW T. WILLIAMS, THE RISE OF FIDUCIARY
CAPITALISM: HOW INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS CAN MAKE CORPORATE AMERICA MORE
DEMOCRATIC 52-58 (2000) (discussing the emergence of fiduciary capitalism as institutional
investors take large ownership interests in equity markets).
7. See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark et al., Social and Environmental Shareholder Activism in
the Public Spotlight: US Corporate Annual Meetings, Campaign Strategies, and
Environmental Performance, 2001–04, 40 ENV’T & PLAN. 1370, 1371 (2008) (observing
that “the business of business is business”).
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foremost a social institution and is treated as such in corporate law. 8 In
many jurisdictions, the formal purpose of the corporation references the
‘social good,’ albeit in a variety of guises, often stating an explicit
commitment to community welfare and economic value. Even in the
Anglo-American world, companies seeking social kudos often proclaim
commitment to community norms and expectations. Managing public
expectations goes well beyond managing investor expectations, a fact-oflife recognized as such by non-governmental organizations (hereinafter
“NGOs”) and community groups at the interface between media and
markets. 9 Mobilizing public confidence in corporate responsibility while
remaining duty-bound by statutory obligations to shareholder value is a
challenging task. 10
The issue of corporate responsibility has four distinct dimensions:
social expectations, investor expectations (short-term and long-term),
governmental expectations (statute and regulations), and theoretical-cumacademic expectations. We should take care not to discount the
significance of any of these expectations, least of all the theoretical or “inprinciple” expectations of the academic community. 11 These expectations
can be important, given that the debate about the relative value of national
models of corporate governance in global financial markets will have farreaching consequences for the nature and scope of standards adopted by
supra-national legislative entities such as the EU and the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB). 12 The genesis of the UK Companies
Act 2006 (hereinafter “the Companies Act”) is linked to Directive
2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 18 June
2003 (hereinafter “the EU Modernization Directive”), as well as deeplyentrenched domestic conceptions of the proper responsibilities of corporate

8. See KLAUS J HOPT, Common Principles of Corporate Governance in Europe?, in
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE REGIMES: CONVERGENCE AND DIVERSITY § 3.1 (Joseph A
McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (describing the public interesting German corporations).
9. See Pratima Bansal & Iain Clelland, Talking Trash: Legitimacy, Impression
Management, and Unsystematic Risk in the Context of the Natural Environment, 47 ACAD.
MGMT. J. 93, 101 (2004) (arguing that managers can increase a firm’s environmental
legitimacy by “minimiz[ing] negative media reports”).
10. See Doreen McBarnet, Corporate Social Responsibility Beyond Law, Through Law,
For Law: The New Corporate Accountability, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW 9 (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds., 2007)
(describing the broad range of issues encompassed by corporate social responsibility).
11. See Christine Parker, Meta-regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social
Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10, at 236-7 (arguing
for the meta-regulatory potential of law).
12. See RONALD J. GILSON, Globalizing Corporate Governance: Convergence of Form
or Function, in CONVERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 129-130
(Jeffrey N. Gordon & Mark J. Roe eds., 2004) (discussing the relative value of national
models of corporate governance).
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officers. 13 Understanding corporate responsibility, as embedded in the
Companies Act, requires an appreciation of the interests of those
stakeholders who sought to influence the conception and implementation of
the Act.
Our paper has three goals. First, we show that the Companies Act is,
in part, an expression of the EU modernization project, amplified by the
UK Labor government (hereinafter “the Government”) to further the global
status of the UK as a leading standard-setting jurisdiction. Second, we
suggest that the Companies Act can be seen as an expression of
conventional microeconomic theoretical expectations with regard to the
proper roles and responsibilities of corporate officers rather than an
expression of conventional corporate social responsibility (hereinafter
“CSR”) discourse. 14 By conventional CSR discourse we mean a theory of
the firm in which the firm has a responsibility to external stakeholders
(whether social, environmental, ethical or otherwise). Third, we argue that
the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act are entirely consistent
with Anglo-American investor expectations with regard to the premium on
the free-flow of market-sensitive data. While disclosure requirements seem
to match the expectations of many social activists, especially regarding
firms’ long-term environmental liabilities, the motivating logic of such
disclosure has more to do with the market pricing of corporate value than
expansion of the scope of corporate social responsibility.
Indeed the current global credit crisis, which has its origins in
widespread defaults on subprime mortgage loans in the United States, is an
example where the lack of transparency in financial markets resulted in
asymmetric information and the mis-pricing of the real risk behind traded
Whatever the nature and scope of
mortgage-backed derivatives. 15
disclosure, care should be taken not to exaggerate the commitment of
institutional investors to disclosure regulation for ethical reasons as
opposed to an interest in the more accurate determination of asset pricing.
13. See The Companies Act, 2006, c. 46 (Eng.); EUR. PARL. & COUNCIL, Directive
2003/51/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, June 18 2003, Amending
Directives 78/660/EEC, 83/349/EEC, 86/635/EEC and 91/674/EEC on the Annual and
Consolidated Accounts of Certain Types of Companies, Banks and Other Financial
Institutions and Insurance Undertakings. This Directive was passed by both Parliament and
the Council as required under the co-decision procedure.
We understand from
conversations with Cynthia A. Williams and industry sources that the UK Government was
unaware of the EU Modernization Directive during its company law reform process, but
added language to incorporate the EU process when they belatedly recognized that a parallel
process was going on in Europe. However, we have not been able to verify this was the
case.
14. See MICHAEL C. JENSEN, A THEORY OF THE FIRM: GOVERNANCE, RESIDUAL CLAIMS,
AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS (2000).
15. See James L. Bicksler, The Subprime Mortgage Debacle and Its Linkages to
Corporate Governance, 5 INT'L J. DISCLOSURE AND GOVERNANCE, 295, 295-96 (2008).
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In conclusion, we distinguish between the demand and supply of disclosure
and the interests of public and private pension funds.
In these ways, we challenge those who argue that the Companies Act
is a major step forward in defining the nature and scope of corporate
responsibility. We concede that it is important, but argue that its
importance is to be found in its commitment to improving information
disclosure relevant to market pricing. By our assessment, the Government
was able to marry together otherwise competing expectations of social
activists and investors in a model of disclosure that is quite innovative
because it fitted well into information-dependent theories of financial
market performance. 16 Equally, the Government was able to use this
template to tame more radical amendments for disclosure on environmental
footprints and global supplier-network conditions. Whether the form of
disclosure on these issues will be effective depends, in part, on the degree
to which institutional investors are willing to act on the information. Some
may, but we suggest that many of the largest private pension funds will not
because of conflicts of interest inherent in these types of institutions.
II.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE MODERN ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATION
AND FINANCE SECTOR

A.

Modern Capitalism

In his treatment of post-war economic structure and performance,
Shonfield marveled at the rate of growth in U.K. employment and income
over the previous twenty years. 17 By his account, the chronic instability
and poor performance of the U.K. economy through the inter-war years had
been solved by the existence of built-in economic stabilizers and Keynesian
control over the business cycle. 18 Some forty years ago, Shonfield argued
that the conflict over consumption and investment, which had bedevilled
the first half of the twentieth century, would be resolved through the
judicious use of national planning (especially regarding education and
training), economic management, the welfare state, and the regulation of
the large enterprises that dominated the economy. As for long-term
growth, Shonfield suggested that many enterprises were of sufficient
economic size to mobilize the internal resources necessary to invest in the
16. See WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR. & JOSEPH D. DOWNING, INFORMATION MARKETS:
WHAT BUSINESSES CAN LEARN FROM FINANCIAL INNOVATION 11-16 (2001) (presenting an
information-based analysis of financial markets).
17. ANDREW SHONFIELD, MODERN CAPITALISM: THE CHANGING BALANCE OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE POWER 4 (1965).
18. Id. at 17.
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next wave of innovation. 19
Shonfield’s treatise was matched in the U.S. by Galbraith’s The New
Industrial State. 20
Both writers were transfixed by the emerging
“partnership” between the nation-state and the modern corporation,
suggesting that the bureaucratic management of markets and incomes were
to their mutual advantage. Elsewhere, Clark develops these claims about
the symbiosis between the nation-state and the corporation for AngloAmerican economies in the years leading up to about 1973, emphasizing
their implications for the management of labor resources and the
consequent growth of private pension systems. 21 The golden era of growth
was dominated by large industrial corporations, relatively high levels of
unionization, and growing real incomes. It was also an era in which
corporations held their assets as physical plant and equipment, market
incumbency being the basis for long-term investment. Shonfield concluded
that the “modern private enterprise” viewed itself as a “permanent
institution.” 22
Shonfield and Galbraith wrote of a mode of accumulation at its peak.
Through the 1970s, the U.K. experienced high levels of unemployment,
slowing growth in real income, and rapid de-industrialization as private
institutions faced the full force of international competition for market
share. While U.S. industry was not to face these competitive pressures
until the 1980s, by the early 1990s Jensen argued that the U.S. industrial
corporation had proven unable to respond effectively to growing market
competition because of management entrenchment and an imperfect market
for corporate control. 23 Coming out of the 1980s, the U.K. economy had
entered a new phase of accumulation where real incomes were now driven
by employment in service industries and London’s pivotal role in the
emerging global financial industry. 24 By the end of the 1990s, the U.S.
economy had also been transformed, albeit with greater income disparity
and the remarkable persistence of a number of enormous industrial firms
that refused to die. 25
19. Id. at 363.
20. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE NEW INDUSTRIAL STATE (1967).
21. Gordon L. Clark, Re-writing Pension Fund Capitalism 1: The Modern Corporation
and Pension Benefit Systems in a World of Perpetual Motion (Oxford Univ. Sch. Geography
& Env., Working Paper No. 05-08, 2005).
22. SHONFIELD, supra note 17, at 376-77.
23. Michael C. Jensen, The Modern Industrial Revolution, Exit, and the Failure of
Internal Control Systems, 48 J. FIN. 831, 850-62 (1993).
24. See GORDON L. CLARK, EUROPEAN PENSIONS & GLOBAL FINANCE 170-92 (2003)
(explaining London’s prominent role in the world’s financial services industries).
25. See Ashby H. Monk, The Knot of Contracts: The Corporate Geography of Legacy
Costs, 84 ECON. GEOGRAPHY 221, 228-29 (2008) (arguing that a modern economy is
uncompetitive if its labor force consists largely of unskilled workers, but that many
American firms resist change because of anticipated transition costs, both to the firm and to

2009]

UK COMPANIES ACT 2006

265

Our point in rehearsing the recent history of the U.K. and U.S. is to
stress that, not so long ago, the modern corporation was a power in the
land. It dominated domestic markets, controlled its financial destiny, and
was an equal partner with the nation-state in fostering the growth and
development of its home-market. The modern corporation and its
associated unions could often negotiate their shares of revenue (retained
earnings and wages) to their mutual benefit, leaving the residual to be paid
as dividends to shareholders.
Three forces conspired to undercut the power of the modern
corporation. 26 First, the liberalization of product markets through the
European Economic Community (followed by the EU) effectively pitted
U.K. industry against its nearest-neighbours. Notwithstanding the costs of
competition, British firms resisted competition in part because of much
lower rates of productivity growth and technological innovation compared
to robust European national champions. Slow rates of growth turned into
profound economic crisis. These competitive forces found in the
momentum associated with twenty-first global economic integration, now
threaten continental Europe. Second, as industry in the UK failed under the
weight of this resistance, the nation-state came to realize that the post-war
“partnership” could no longer be relied upon to deliver employment and
rising living standards. This political calculus effectively discounted hidebound class alliances, replacing the partnership with a more distant
relationship such that the corporation was increasingly seen as a means to
an end. 27 The nation-state invigorated the market for corporate control so
as to sustain the growth of national income (if not the interests of corporate
elites).
The fledgling financial services industry fueled the transformation of
British industry, the economy and society. Underpinned by the reserves of
established banks and insurance companies, the assets of public and private
funded pension systems created in the aftermath of the Second World War
flooded into London. Thatcher’s “Big Bang” liberalized London’s
markets, providing domestic savings with a global platform for portfolio
investment around the world. Intended or not, the “Big Bang,” combined
with burgeoning market liquidity, gave the London market a significant
“first-mover” advantage over continental rivals, reinforced by the in-flow
from American investment houses followed by the acceleration of global
financial integration from the mid-1990s. Third, pension funds and
individuals).
26. Luigi Zingales, In Search of New Foundations, 55 J. FIN. 1623, 1642-43 (2000).
27. See Kevin Campbell & Douglas Vick, Disclosure Law and the Market for
Corporate Social Responsibility, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY, supra note 10,
at 243-44 (analyzing the expansion of corporate social responsibility accountability fostered
by the United Kingdom's new legal disclosure strategy).
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institutional investors swamped the internal resources of corporations,
driving a wedge between the generation of earned income and the financing
of corporate strategy and investment. As foreign banks came to London for
a global and European location, the cozy alliances of the past were
fractured.
Unlike much of continental Europe, the Anglo-American financial
sector has grown separately from industry and the state. Because of the
trust institution, the application of fiduciary duty as the governing ethic,
and the legal separation of asset management from pension plan sponsors’
treasuries, it is arguable that plan sponsors, being the origin of pension
assets, are also, paradoxically, the object of financial institutions’
investment strategies. 28 Given the goal of maximizing the portfolio riskadjusted rate of return, the average traded firm has been forced into a
corner: being just one stock in large diversified portfolios, it is neither held
nor traded on its particular merits nor is its management necessarily held to
account for poor performance. It is all about the short-term pricing of
stocks given the flow of information about actual and expected earnings
and market capitalization. Automated trading systems cued to changes in
stock market pricing and linked to stock market indices dominate daily
trading volume. 29
The modern corporation has become the traded object of global
financial markets and, in some cases, deliberately so. 30 Not surprisingly,
the demand for information on its structure and performance has come to
dominate debate over the proper substance of company law, pitting national
traditions against the logic of global financial market integration. 31
B.

Institutional Investors, Markets, and Disclosure

We have suggested that the growth of retirement savings in
institutions held at arms-length from the immediate interests of sponsoring
companies altered the balance of power in financial markets in favor of
28. See Gordon L. Clark & Tessa Hebb, Pension Fund Corporate Engagement: The
Fifth Stage of Capitalism, 59 INDUS. REL. 142, 142 (2004) (arguing that pension funds
aggregate the disbursed ownership of beneficiaries and can therefore act as unified entities
with a single voice to engage companies).
29. See E. PHILIP DAVIS & BENN STEIL, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS 347 (2001)
(describing automation in institutional trading).
30. See GORDON L. CLARK & DARIUSZ WOJICK, THE GEOGRAPHY OF FINANCE:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE 133 (2007) (researching the
demand for cross-listing of publicly listed firms).
31. See Susan Strange, The Future of Global Capitalism; Or, Will Divergence Persist
Forever?, in POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MODERN CAPITALISM: MAPPING CONVERGENCE AND
DIVERGENCE 182, 184-85 (Colin Crouch & Wolfgang Streeck eds., 1997) (introducing
analysis of whether more integration of world markets lends itself to greater convergence of
world economy).
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third-party investors. Elsewhere, the nature and significance of this
transformation for the structure of Anglo-American financial markets is
described in detail and is referred to by Clark and Hebb as the “fifth stage
of capitalism.” 32 This develops Robert Clark’s 1981 account of the
historical evolution of management theories over two centuries. 33 As
pension and retirement savings accumulated over the second half of the
twentieth century, a revolution was taking place in the investment of those
assets, accentuating the growing separation between traded companies and
institutional investors and their market intermediaries. 34 This conceptual
and analytical revolution has arguably remade the structure and
performance of global financial markets in its image. 35
As is well-appreciated, even in crisis the vast majority of pension
funds, mutual funds insurance companies, and endowments abide by the
principles of modern portfolio theory (hereinafter “MPT”). 36 In brief, these
principles are as follows: (1) there is a correlation between risk and return
such that investment can be assessed in accordance with expected riskadjusted rates of return; (2) investment strategy is about managing portfolio
risk such that any particular investment and its associated risk and return
characteristics should be judged against investors’ overall objectives; and
(3) markets are so efficient that active investing—picking winning stocks
over losing stocks—is not a viable long-term investment strategy. MPT
provides a rationale for holding large swaths of whole markets and treating
particular stocks as components in a comprehensive strategy of investment
management. Given the costs of active management and the unlikely
prospect of being able to formulate a consistent winning strategy, passive
portfolio investment is the operative strategy. 37
32. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 28, at 143.
33. See Robert Charles Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on
Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARV. L. REV. 561, 562 (1981) (arguing that the
history of capitalism is composed of four stages, each of which presented problems
demanding a specific legal framework to address them).
HOW PENSION FUNDS
34. See MICHAEL J. CLOWES, THE MONEY FLOOD:
REVOLUTIONIZED INVESTING 1-18 (2000).
35. See generally DONALD MACKENZIE, AN ENGINE, NOT A CAMERA: HOW FINANCIAL
MODELS SHAPE MARKETS (2006) (describing modern portfolio theory).
36. See JOHN Y. CAMPBELL & LUIS M. VICEIRA, STRATEGIC ASSET ALLOCATION:
PORTFOLIO CHOICE FOR LONG TERM INVESTORS 222-24 (2002) (providing an analysis of how
an individual investor would best allocate wealth into broad asset classes over a lifetime
under a number of different variables).
37. See BOB LITTERMAN & GOLDMAN SACHS ASSET MANAGEMENT QUANTITATIVE
RESOURCES GROUP, MODERN INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT: AN EQUILIBRIUM APPROACH 2526 (2003). This is not, of course, the full story. Recent research in the U.K. and the U.S. on
the persistence of “winning” traders suggests that a small set of market players are able to
produce out-performance in a systematic manner by virtue of their buying (but not selling)
strategies. This is apparently the case for individuals as well as institutions (although the
latter are likely to dominate the former). It is also widely believed that out-performance
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Systematic out-sourcing of investment management from all but the
largest of pension funds has accompanied the revolution in financial
markets (note that mutual funds and insurance companies have, by their
very nature, tended to internally manage pension and retirement savings).
There are significant economies of scale in managing the flow of assets
from contributors to funds to managers and in return to funds and their
beneficiaries (witness the market dominance of custodial firms like State
Street Bank of Boston). Likewise, there are economies of scale in
executing planned trading strategies that vary by asset class and market
segment. Just as importantly, while many investment banks offer a full
range of investment management services, these firms often claim a
stronger reputation in one asset class over others (for example, PIMCO in
bonds but not in equities). Specialized knowledge and expertise are a
continuing source of competitive advantage, notwithstanding the claims
made by bulge-bracket firms for the cost-advantages of complementary
products. 38
Just as importantly, the accumulated size, complexity, and timesensitivity of global financial markets have effectively disenfranchised
pension fund trustees from direct operational responsibility for investment
management. Recognizing this fact, pension fund trustees have been left
with the responsibility for overall investment strategy, informed, of course,
by modern portfolio theory. 39 Only rarely, and mostly in public pension
funds, do trustees seek to influence the trajectory of particular stocks.
This story about the structure and control of investment management
has been told a number of times. In recent years, the story has been
complicated by a loss of confidence in the efficient markets hypothesis,
which underpins the third MPT principle noted above, the rise and fall of
hedge funds and alternative asset classes like infrastructure, and the search
for alpha (a premium on active investment) over beta (the performance of
whole markets). The global credit crisis has also undercut the credibility of
less-than-transparent risk transfer devices such as collateralized debt
obligations (for example, mortgages). It is apparent that only the bestgoverned funds and institutions focused on risk management and return
declines as the net inflow of assets to “winning” mutual funds dampens the capacity of those
entities to sustain their distinctive strategies. See, e.g., Aneel Keswani & David Stolin,
Which Money is Smart? Mutual Fund Buys and Sells of Individual and Institutional
Investors, 63 J. FIN. 85, 85 (2008) (employing a British data set of monthly fund inflows and
outflows differentiated between individual and institutional investors to argue for a robust
“smart money” effect in the United Kingdom).
38. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 180.
39. See Gordon L. Clark & Roger Urwin, Best-Practice Pension Fund Governance, 9 J.
ASSET MGMT. 2, 6-7 (2008) (“Well-governed trustee boards tend to allocate . . . available
time and resources to issues like investment strategy and management that may affect the
long-term integrity of the institution and payment of pension benefits.”).
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volatility have been effective investors in these arenas. For all the publicity
garnered by endowments’ high compound annual rates of return, the
average public and private pension fund has not been engaged in the
frontiers of financial innovation nor has it been able to systematically outperform asset-specific benchmarks. 40
What should be emphasized at this juncture is the degree to which
institutional investors rely upon the veracity of market prices and the
response of financial agents to those prices. The efficient pricing of stocks
and bonds, let alone the more exotic financial instruments such as
collateralized debt obligations is at the very heart of MPT. Even if the
efficient markets hypothesis is not a full account of the anomalies and
biases in market pricing and human behavior, it serves as a normative claim
on the proper value of quoted prices. 41 As such, it is not surprising that
enormous attention is paid by institutional investors (acting on behalf of
their pension fund clients) and governments (acting on behalf of the
welfare of many millions of beneficiaries) to the informational content of
market prices. In the end, the mispricing and systematic distortion of asset
values represents a significant welfare cost to society and, more
immediately, a constraint on the performance of investment managers (as
apparent in the subprime credit crisis). In this respect, the scope of
“disclosure” of market-relevant information by traded companies and
related entities has become the litmus test of financial regulation. 42
As the record shows, however, no country has an unblemished record
in these matters, particularly in relation to the auditing of declared
corporate assets and liabilities (witness the Enron and WorldCom scandals
in the U.S.) and the treatment of insider and outsider shareholders as
regards the timely disclosure of market information (as in much of
continental Europe). 43 La Porta et al. demonstrate the existence of very
different national traditions as regards corporate disclosure policies and the
variable significance attributed to global portfolio investors over
entrenched domestic interests. 44 Apparent differences between countries’
40. See Josh Lerner et al., Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The Limited Partner
Performance Puzzle, 62 J. FIN. 731, 742 (2007) (documenting large heterogeneity in the
performance of investor classes).
41. See Gur Huberman, Behavioural Finance and Markets, in COGNITIVE PROCESSES
AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOUR 1-15 (Nicola Dimitri et al. eds., 2003).
42. See Tessa Hebb, The Economic Inefficiency of Secrecy: Pension Fund Investors’
Corporate Transparency Concerns, 63 J. BUS. ETHICS 385, 391 (2006) (reporting a shift to
“corporate governance campaigns aimed at raising information within the firm”).
43. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top?: The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1780-81 (2002) (discussing the fuller disclosure requirements of a U.S. stock
exchange.). For the European comparison see supra note 31.
44. See Rafael La Porta et al., Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. FIN. 1131,
1149 (1997) (showing that civil law countries have “the weakest investor protections and
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disclosure regimes have prompted some of the world’s largest pension
funds to agitate for reform either directly through the lobbying of
governments or through the leverage applied by the differential investment
of their own assets by company and country. 45 As such, some of the
world’s largest pension funds have been identified as important innovators
in their own right, assuming the responsibilities and obligations of
“universal owners.” 46
In this context, the election of the UK Labor government in 1997 and
the booming securities markets in the run-up to 9/11 seemed to offer a
chance for social activists to mobilize the power of institutional investors.
As part of a larger debate over the prospects for a U.K. stakeholder society
and the lessons to be learned about CSR from continental European social
democracies, the Labor government was lobbied to make good on the
promise to affect socially responsible investment. 47
In 1999 the
Government issued changes in regulations, the Occupational Pension
Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture, Bankruptcy, etc.)
Amendment Regulations, under the Pensions Act 1995 wherein trustees of
occupational (and thereafter local government pension funds) were
required to disclose in a written statement of investment principles the
following: (a) “the extent (if at all) to which social, environmental or
ethical considerations are taken into account in the selection, retention and
realization of investments”; and (b) “their policy (if any) in relation to the
exercise of the rights (including voting rights) attached to investments.” 48
For all the critical comment that has accompanied this regulation, there are
three reasons why its impact has proven to be rather limited. 49 Most
least developed capital markets”). While the problems of management entrenchment and
the influence of insiders over outsiders are often discussed with reference to continental
Europe, it is apparent that some analysts of corporate governance would dispute the
presumption in favor of U.S. standards of corporate governance. See, e.g., Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 843-850
(2005) (analyzing the costs of management entrenchment in the U.S. and the improper
limits imposed on institutional investors in exercising their “ownership” rights).
45. See Tessa Hebb & Dariusz Wójcik, Global Standards and Emerging Markets: The
Institutional Investment Value Chain and CalPERS’ Investment Strategy, 37 ENV’T & PLAN.
1955, 1971 (2005) (arguing for greater convergence to global standards when key actors in
the investment value chain demand levels of corporate and social behavior greater than
those consistent with a country's current regulatory framework).
46. HAWLEY & WILLIAMS, supra note 6, at 22.
47. See WILL HUTTON, THE STATE WE'RE IN (1997) (discussing the prospects for a UK
stakeholder society).
48. The Occupational Pension Schemes (Investment, and Assignment, Forfeiture,
Bankruptcy etc.) Amendment Regulations 1999, 1999, S.I. 1849, cl. 2(4)(b) (U.K.).
49. See John M. Conley & Cynthia A. Williams, Engage, Embed, and Embellish:
Theory Versus Practice in the Corporate Social Responsibility Movement, 31 J. CORP. L. 1,
35-37 (2005) (describing three groups into which beneficiaries who support socially
responsible investing divide themselves).
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obviously, the change in regulation pre-supposed corporate disclosure on
these issues whereas the nature and scope of corporate disclosure were not
directly affected. In any event, though hardly recognized at the time, the
effects of the change in regulation were to fall largely on fund managers
rather than on pension funds. Fund managers were reluctant to engage with
the issues unless directly required by their clients. 50 In this respect, the
regulation did not require institutional investors to take social,
environmental or ethical considerations into account in their investment
decisions. The Government also rejected a proposal by the U.K. Social
Investment Forum for amendment to the Financial Services and Markets
Act 2000 to include the provision of environmental investment and related
lending products within the Financial Services Authority’s mandate. 51
III. THE EMERGENCE OF MANDATORY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS OF
NON-FINANCIAL INFORMATION
A.

The EU Modernisation Directive

The EU Modernisation Directive was a product of the Lisbon Strategy
of 2000 which sought to build competitive and efficient European financial
markets. 52 The Strategy set 2005 as the deadline by which the European
Commission’s Financial Services Action Plan (“FSAP”) of 1999 would be
implemented. 53 The motivating purpose of the FSAP was to “enhance the
comparability of financial statements prepared by Community companies

50. The global finance industry’s lack of responsiveness to social concerns, indeed
social welfare, is one of the topics explored in JOHN C. BOGLE, THE BATTLE FOR THE SOUL
OF CAPITALISM (2005).
51. U.K. Social Investment Forum, “UK Social Investment Forum Tells MPs of Need
to Include Environment in Framework for Financial Services Regulator” (Press Release,
April 19, 1999), at www.uksif.org/press/welcome/frameset.shtml; Financial Services and
Markets Act, 2000. If limited in scope, the U.K. “reform” did spark legislative initiatives in
continental Europe and Australia for fund managers to actively consider social,
environmental and ethical concerns in their investment decisions. Sweden introduced the
toughest provisions regarding social and environmental disclosure. Regulatory reforms in
January 2001 required Sweden’s five largest state-run pensions to incorporate
environmental and ethical considerations in their investment strategies as well as report to
the Government on the implementation of this policy: “investments activities shall take
environmental and ethical considerations into account without lowering the overall objective
of a high return.” Fjärde AP-fonden (Fourth Swedish National Pension Fund), A
Presentation of Seden’s New National Pension Funds 4 (2001).
52. Presidency Conclusions, Lisbon European Council (March 23-24, 2000), available
at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm.
53. Commission Communication Implementing the Framework for Financial Markets:
Action Plan, COM (1999) 232 final (May 11, 1999), available at
http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l24210.htm.
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whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market.” 54
Regulations which emerged from the FSAP included Regulation (EC) No
1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 July 2002
which introduced the requirement that European-listed companies prepare
consolidated accounts in accordance with International Accounting
Standards from 2005 onwards. 55 The EU Modernisation Directive sought
to ensure that annual and consolidated reporting for EU companies was in
line with best practice, including the reporting of financial and nonfinancial information.
The EU Modernisation Directive was ambitious in its scope,
amending both annual reporting under Directive 78/660/EC and
consolidated annual reporting under Directive 83/349/EEC. It instituted a
system of reporting whereby companies must provide “at least a fair review
of the development and performance of the company’s business . . .
together with the principal risks and uncertainties that it faces.” 56 Although
this did not explicitly refer to environmental, social or governance factors
of firms, the Directive provided that “where appropriate, non-financial key
performance indicators relevant to the particular business, including
information relating to environmental and employee matters” shall be
reported. 57
The EU strategic plan subsequent to the Lisbon Strategy, the Action
Plan on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance
in the European Union launched by the European Commission in May
2003, was one of the points of reference for the UK’s 2005 White Paper on
Company Law Reform (“White Paper”). 58 The White Paper was framed
around four strategic objectives: (1) to enhance shareholder engagement
and a long-term investment culture; (2) to ensure better company regulation
and a “think small first” approach; (3) to make it easier to set-up and run a
company in the UK; and (4) to provide greater flexibility for corporate
reforms in the future. The White Paper described disclosure reforms as “a
further major step forward in improving company reporting and
transparency and in promoting effective dialogue on the key drivers of
long-term company performance.” 59 Heightened disclosure standards were
driven by a commitment to a more efficient market pricing of traded
54. See EU Modernisation Directive, supra note 13 at cl. 1.
55. 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1.
56. EU Modernisation Directive, supra note 13 at art. 1 cl. 14(a) and art. 2 cl. 10(a).
57. Id.
58. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament
on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European
Union—A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003), at 23;
DEPARTMENT OF TRADE & INDUSTRY, COMPANY LAW REFORM, 2005, Cm. 6456, available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/bbf/co-act-2006/white-paper/page22800.html.
59. White Paper at 10.
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companies, implying that stock prices ought to be determined by long-term
value.
Unresolved was whether non-financial disclosure had separate status
or was dependent upon a demonstrable link to stock market pricing. The
initial legislative effects of the EU Modernisation Directive and the White
Paper on greater disclosure of financial and non-financial information came
through in the 2005 amendments to the UK Companies Act 1985
(hereafter, OFR Regulations). 60 Among the items considered, these
amendments established the requirement for an Operating and Financial
Review (“OFR”) for quoted companies. One motivation behind these
amendments was the incorporation into U.K. law of the new accounting
requirements introduced under the EU Modernization Directive. There
were, however, other important domestic considerations in the U.K.’s
purpose and intended effects of these reforms.
The domestic considerations behind the OFR reforms can be
elucidated from the Department of Trade and Industry’s “Final Regulatory
Impact Assessment on the Operating and Financial Review and Directors’
Report Regulations.” 61 The Department noted that sophisticated financial
disclosure regime was needed to encourage capital market activity. 62 The
key purpose and intended effect of the OFR was to improve shareholder
engagement (as opposed to stakeholder engagement), and it was argued
that clear, meaningful, and reliable information about the main drivers of a
company’s performance was the best way to encourage shareholders and
potential investors to exercise effective and responsible control in their
investment decisions. 63 It was also argued that where market asymmetries
of information were overcome, investors would be more able to invest in
capital markets with reduced adverse selection and therefore lower liquidity
risks. 64
Improved transparency through greater access to data on quoted
companies should place shareholders in a better position to effectively
protect their interests and control directors’ overreach. 65 In addition,
adopting the “fair review” standard from the EU Modernisation Directive
would lead to “greater transparency and precision of company reporting on

60. The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report
etc.) Regulations 2005, S.I. 2005/1011 [hereinafter “OFR Regulations”].
61. UK Department of Trade & Industry, Final Regulatory Impact Assessment on the
Operating and Financial Review and Directors’ Report Regulations, available at
http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file21361.pdf.
62. Id. at ¶ 5.
63. Id. at ¶¶ 4, 9.
64. Id. at ¶ 8.
65. See Bauer, supra note 3 (noting that “the market for corporate control is
increasingly important in promoting short -and medium-term shareholder value”).
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performance on financial and non-financial matters.” 66 Environmental
disclosures were to be elements of non-financial “matters,” acknowledging
the pressure on businesses to account for the increasingly important
intangible asset value of a firm based on its brand image and reputation. 67
In this way, although the OFR demonstrated similarities to the EU
Modernisation Directive by requiring reporting on non-financial matters,
the OFR’s broader focus on shareholders’ interests and the proper pricing
of a company’s future financial performance distinguished the OFR from
continental European notions of stakeholder capitalism in favor of the
predominant concerns of Anglo-American shareholder capitalism. 68
Indeed, the U.K.’s particular concern for shareholders’ interests may
explain the more rigorous disclosure provisions in the OFR compared with
the EU Modernisation Directive. The EU Modernisation Directive applied
to large and medium-sized companies without distinguishing between
quoted and non-quoted companies, and framed its reporting provisions on
financial and non-financial information generally without specific reference
to the kind of information which would need to be disclosed nor the
intended recipients of this information. However, the government made
the U.K. position clear by emphasizing that the requirement to disclose
non-financial information was directed at the interests of shareholders
rather than stakeholders: “The Government believes that the shareholder
base of quoted companies—typically large and diverse—has different and
additional needs to that of private companies, hence the requirement to
prepare a more fulsome, and more forward-looking review than that
required under the [EU Modernisation] Directive.” 69 In this sense, the
UK’s OFR was largely motivated by a conviction that environmental and
social information had a clear link to stock market pricing and future
financial performance.
Although the reasons for the OFR’s broad disclosure of non-financial
information including, where appropriate, corporate environmental and
social responsibility (hereafter, CESR) were grounded in conventional
66. UK Department of Trade & Industry, supra note 61, at ¶ 13.
67. Id. at ¶ 18. The significance of intangible assets for the modern corporation clearly
varies by sector, and the history of a corporation. Methods of discriminating between
corporations as regards their sensitivity to reputation have been developed, in part, based
upon proprietary databases. See, e.g., Gordon L. Clark & James Salo, Corporate
Governance and Environmental Risk Management: A Quantitative Analysis of ‘New
Paradigm’ Firms, in PENSIONS AT WORK: SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT OF UNIONBASED PENSION FUNDS 129, (Jack Quarter et al. eds., 2008) (analyzing differing
management styles in response to growing financial risk).
68. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 35 (suggesting that the OFR represented a
push away from stakeholder capitalism within the U.K., which is contrary to what we
argue). Rather, we claim the OFR distinguished itself from what we define as conventional
CSR because it was ultimately focused on shareholders’ financial interests.
69. UK Department of Trade & Industry, supra note 61 at ¶ 14.
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theories of the firm, they also satisfied NGO interests in corporate social
responsibility. As discussed, these provisions directly incorporated the
requirements for “fair review” reporting of a company’s development,
performance, or position as set out in the EU Modernisation Directive.
However, they went further by requiring companies to report on “the main
trends and factors which are likely to affect that company’s future
development, performance and position.” 70 Additionally, OFR provisions
gave substance to the EU Modernisation Directive’s requirement for nonfinancial reporting on “environmental and employee matters.” 71
Companies were to be required to include information about the
environment including analyzing the impact of the company on the
environment. 72 As well, companies were required to provide “information
about social and community issues.” 73
In November of 2005, however, the UK Chancellor abandoned the
new OFR provisions less than six months after they were introduced
without consultation with the Department of Trade and Industry, other
Ministries, or relevant stakeholders. 74 The publicly stated reason for
abandoning these provisions was the administrative costs associated with
reporting. The then Chancellor (and now Prime Minister) Gordon Brown
said: “I understand the concerns about the extra administrative cost of the
goldplated regulatory requirement that from April next year all quoted
companies must publish an operating and financial review.” 75
The policy reversal was not met with universal acclaim by the
business community. In any event, as we note below, these provisions
reappeared in a weaker form in the Company Law Reform Bill (“Reform
Bill”) which was debated in the House of Lords and the House of
Commons through 2006 before its passage as the UK Companies Act
2006. 76 Lord Sharman during the Second Reading on the Reform Bill in
the House of Lords assessed the political and business communities’
positions on disclosure in the following terms:

70. OFR Regulations, supra note 60 at § 1(d).
71. Id. at part 2, § 234ZZB, cl. 3(b).
72. Id. at part 9, § 4, cl. 1(a).
73. Id. at part 9, § 4, cl. 1(c).
74. For example, in anticipation of the adoption of the OPR, the UK Accounting
Standards Board had published an Exposure Draft in 2005 canvassing the likely scope of
expected disclosure as well as various measures needed to implement the policy.
75. Chancellor Gives ONS Independence, BBC NEWS, Nov. 28, 2006, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/4477516.stm; see also Cynthia A. Williams & John M.
Conley, Triumph or Tragedy? The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the
U.K., 31 WM & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 317, 327-361 (2007) (offering a more
detailed discussion on the political story surrounding the UK Government’s policy reversal
on the OFR.)
76. Company Law Reform Bill, 2005, H.L. Bill [34].

276

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

[T]he Chancellor’s statement abolishing the OFR simply did not
earn him the brownie points from the business community that he
anticipated . . . [i]nvesting bodies like the notion of an OFR and
the issues that have given rise to concern did not involve whether
there should be an OFR, but involved some of the data that were
to be required. 77
B.

Passage of the UK Companies Act 2006

In the Reform Bill, the companies’ obligation to report non-financial
information as per the OFR was replaced by company directors’ obligation
to produce an annual business review. 78 The Bill abandoned substantial
provisions which had appeared in the OFR. First, the Reform Bill dropped
the requirement for forward-looking reporting on the main trends and
factors likely to affect the company’s future. Second, although the business
review would be required to include information on environmental and
employee matters where appropriate, social and community issues were
Furthermore, environmental matters no longer explicitly
omitted. 79
included the impact of the business on the environment, and the
requirement to disclose a company’s environmental impact assessment
policies and the success of their implementation was abandoned. Finally,
whereas the OFR and the EU Modernisation Directive required businesses
to report in a manner consistent with their size and complexity, the Reform
Bill exempted businesses qualifying as “medium-sized” from reporting
non-financial information. 80
In debates through the House of Commons and House of Lords,
however, the Government was pressured to reinstate many of the OFR
provisions which had been removed in the business review section of the
Reform Bill. Although there was lobbying from both the NGO and
business communities, the key reforms which made it into the Bill were
based on mainstream microeconomic theories of the firm and efficient
markets vis-à-vis information disclosure, rather than a radical CSR model
for the U.K. corporation.
In this respect, the Government’s disclosure regime was consistent
with Jensen’s theory of the firm. 81 An implicit assumption permeating
debate in the House of Commons and House of Lords was that information
related to environmental and social matters is crucial for markets to
accurately evaluate the market prices of firms. Jensen argued that the firm
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

677 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 194.
Reform Bill, supra note 76, at § 390, cl. 2.
Id. at § 390, cl. 4(b).
Id. at § 390, cl. 7.
See JENSEN, supra note 14, at 85-87.
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is a product of the relationship between principals (shareholders) and
agents (management), and that shareholders and managers do not have the
same interests. Consequently, resources (both pecuniary and nonpecuniary) are expended by both parties to maximize their private interests.
Shareholders commit “monitoring expenditures” in order to oversee
directors’ actions and seek to limit activities that harm their interests. 82
Directors, on the other hand, give shareholders appropriate incentives in the
contracting relationship to deflect suspicion and pay shareholders “bonding
costs” to guarantee that shareholders will not hinder their activities. 83
Jensen described the total costs which arise from this “unavoidable”
tension between shareholders and directors as “agency costs.” 84 Agency
costs can be positive and even desirable so long as the benefits to the firm’s
yield exceed the downside costs.
In the final version of the Reform Bill, disclosure was deemed
necessary in order to give effect to the newly codified directors’ duty to act
in a way which is “most likely to promote the success of the company for
the benefit of its members as a whole.” 85 In carrying out this duty, the new
drafting of Section 172 stated that directors would:
[H]ave regard (amongst other matters) to:
(a) the likely consequences of any decision in the long term;
...
(c) the need to foster the company’s business relationships with
suppliers, customers and others,
(d) the impact of the company’s operation on the community and
the environment,
(e) the desirability of the company maintaining a reputation for
high standards of business conduct . . . 86
In effect, this provision identified CESR matters as issues to which
directors would need to turn their mind to in carrying out their duties for
the benefit of the company. This is very different from CSR where the
company is motivated by responsibilities towards external stakeholders.
In the Grand Committee stage in the House of Lords and throughout
the passage of the Bill, the issue was whether the duty to promote the
success of the company was a new duty, which therefore required a change
in implementation arrangements to support this duty, or whether it simply
made no difference. Lord Sharman’s view was that a new duty would be
formed to push the Anglo-Saxon model of corporate endeavor “to a more
not quite pluralist society but rather a northern European model where there
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 86.
Id.
Id.
Companies Act 2006, c. 46, supra note 13, at § 172.
Id.

278

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 11:2

are a group of stakeholders [that] are involved.” 87 This was contested by
Lord Hodgson who argued that the Bill simply codified common law duties
and therefore made no substantive difference to the existing legal
position. 88
Lord Sainsbury, Under-Secretary of State for the Department of Trade
and Industry, sought to clarify the Government’s position. Although he
acknowledged that the Reform Bill would codify common law duties, he
contended that it would make a substantive difference by identifying
specific factors which are relevant to the success of the company. 89 In this
way, the codification of directors’ duties could be regarded as a monitoring
cost imposed on directors so that shareholders and prospective shareholders
could better assess the risk/return profile of UK firms. The significance of
newly codified directors’ duties, then, was not that they materially changed
the relevance of CESR considerations in terms of the success of the
company. Rather, it was that they explicitly acknowledged what had
previously been taken to be implicit: the importance of CESR factors in
protecting shareholders’ interests and the long-term success of the
company.
In the House of Commons, a company’s environmental and ethical
performance was interpreted as a financial value issue by the
Conservatives, rather than as a purely environmental or conventional CSR
issue. Justine Greening MP argued that:
[A]t the heart of any successful company is an in-depth
understanding of what its customers want and value. Perhaps
more than at any time in the past, customers place a value not just
on what they are purchasing from companies, but on the way in
which companies have carried out their business in order to
provide those products or services. Companies can therefore be
at the forefront of the push to tackle environmental and ethical
issues. 90
She distinguished this financial value-based argument from a purely
environmental-based case for the disclosure regime saying “[a]s the
Minister said, company law is not the best vehicle for addressing wider
social and environmental concerns. We can address those objectives, as
some Government Members have said, through domestic legislation, health
and safety measures and environmental protection, on which progress has
been made.” 91
Also debated was the need for an auditor’s report to verify the validity
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

679 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 169.
Id.
Id. at 170.
450 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2006) 889.
Id. at 890.
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of reported information. Baroness Thorton, in the Grand Committee stage
of the House of Lords, identified quality assurance of the information as an
issue which was raised from public consultations on the OFR regulations
but which was not addressed in the Reform Bill. 92 Her concern was echoed
by Baroness Miller who argued that unaudited information would result in
the provisions becoming a “marketing bandwagon” for companies to
promote their alleged “‘ethical,’ ‘sustainable,’ or ‘fair trade’” products and
services. 93 This concern was raised again later in the House of Commons
where it was argued that much of the information presented by companies
on environmental and social responsibility is public relations or “greenwash.” 94 The House of Commons’ focus on this issue indicated a specific
intention to overcome the charge often made of conventional CSR
discourse as an elaborate form of public relations. 95 The auditing of
corporate reports was therefore central to making the information relevant
to actual business performance rather than simply another avenue for
marketing. 96
In the final version of the Companies Act, the provisions regarding the
auditing of disclosed information remained weak. The only explicit
obligation on the auditor is with respect to the directors’ report more
generally, which includes the business review. At section 496 of the
Companies Act, the auditor “must state in his report on the company’s
annual accounts whether in his opinion the information given in the
directors’ report for the financial year for which the accounts are prepared
is consistent with those accounts.” 97 There is no requirement to verify the
validity of the non-financial information itself.
This reflects the
Government’s eagerness to avoid a “prescriptive” or rules-based approach
to reporting. The provisions which do apply to the quality of reporting
hold directors liable for loss to the company suffered as a result of any
untrue or misleading statements in the directors’ report. 98 Personal liability
also attaches to directors if they fail to disclose relevant information to the
company’s auditor or if they fail to take all relevant steps to do so. 99
A related issue which attracted attention in the House of Lords was a
late amendment to the Reform Bill suggested by the House of Commons on
October 18, 2006 to require disclosure of “information about persons with
whom the company has contractual or other arrangements which are
92. 679 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 166.
93. Id. at 167.
94. Id.
95. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 37-38.
96. See Margaret Blair et al., The New Role for Assurance Services in Global
Commerce, 33 J. CORP. L 325, 326-327 (2008).
97. Companies Act 2006, § 496.
98. Id. at § 463.
99. Id. at § 418.
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essential to the business of the company.” 100 This is particularly relevant to
companies’ supply chains. There were two substantive objections to this
amendment debated by the House of Lords. First, it was thought by
Baroness Cohen that disclosure of this information would be detrimental to
business because of its commercially sensitive nature. 101 Second, there was
a concern expressed by Baroness Noakes that the obligation would be too
onerous, since it was unclear how much detail companies would need to
provide so as to comply with the provision. 102
The Government made two clarifications in response to these
concerns. The first was to provide an exception to reporting on supply
chain issues where “disclosure would, in the opinion of the directors, be
seriously prejudicial to that person and contrary to the public interest.” 103
Secondly, the Government did not intend disclosure to be particularly
detailed, but to be sufficiently high-leveled so as to give an impression of
the principal risks and opportunities facing the company.
While these clarifications were sufficient to win support for the
amendment, they also highlighted the absence of rules and regulations
which could serve as benchmarks for the quality and quantity of required
disclosure. The omission of such standards reflected the Government’s
concern not to impose costly reporting obligations on companies, and to
leave much of the nature of reporting to directors’ discretion. But, as Lord
Razzall commented in the final Consideration of Commons Amendments
in the House of Lords on November 2006:
[W]e support the NGOs in believing that the Government . . .
ought to give some indication of what the standard reporting
practice should be, which they have the power to do by
regulation. The whole purpose of this is not only to obtain the
disclosure of information itself, but also to provide a measure by
which a number of ethical investors, or those who wish to invest
within an ethical framework, can obtain comparisons between
different companies. It would be difficult for those ethical
comparisons to be made without some element of standard
reporting practice which I feel can come only from the
Government. 104
It was not just the NGOs but also members within the business
community who were concerned about the lack of a clear reporting

100. Id. at § 417, cl. 5(c).
101. 686 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2006) 465.
102. Id. at 471.
103. Id. at 468.
104. Id. at 459-60. This echoed the principal purpose of the EU Modernisation Directive
which was to generate a common reporting standard so as to allow comparison between
European traded companies on financial and non-financial measures.
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standard.
Ultimately, the disclosure regime promulgated under the final
Companies Act 2006 incorporated elements of the EU Modernisation
Directive. Nonetheless, there were significant differences in form and
substance. In Section 417(2) of the Act, directors, not the company, are
required to compile a business review “to inform members of the company
and help them assess how the directors have performed their duty under
section 172 (duty to promote the success of the company).” 105
Furthermore, for the reasons suggested above, the precise scope and scale
of the business review was more rigorously worded than the EU
Modernisation Directive, as follows:
[T]he business review must, to the extent necessary for the
understanding of the development, performance or position of the
company’s business, include:
(a) the main trends and factors likely to affect the future
development, performance and position of the company’s
business; and
(b) information about (i) environmental matters (including the
impact of the company’s business on the environment), (ii) the
company’s employees, and (iii) social and community issues,
including information about any policies of the company in
relation to those matters and the effectiveness of those policies;
and
(c) subject to subsection (11), information about persons with
whom the company has contractual or other arrangements which
are essential to the business of the company. 106
IV. THE NEW ROLE OF CESR INFORMATION IN THE FINANCE SECTOR
A.

Disclosure Standards and Financial Intermediation

As is the case in many areas of European policy making, member
states are required to adhere to EU Directives unless they have previously
agreed to exceptions specific to a member state (as for the U.K. in selected
areas of policy making). While the EU does lead the U.K. in a variety of
policy areas, especially as regards employment rights and conditions and
environmental policy, it is arguable that the roots of the EU Modernisation
Directive in the Lisbon Strategy (2000) and the commitment to panEuropean integration of financial markets reflected the interest of the
Government (and the city of London in particular) in a growing market for
financial services as well as the unfettered flow of portfolio investment to
105. Companies Act 2006, § 417, cl. 2.
106. Id. at § 417, cl. 5.
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Europe’s largest traded companies. In fact, the EU Modernisation
Directive came to the U.K. policy arena already committed to reinforcing
U.K. global advantages in corporate governance and the “principles
approach” over the “rules and regulation” approach to securities
regulation. 107 In this context, the Companies Act can be seen as one
element in a concerted campaign by the Government to reinforce the
dominance of London in European financial markets, and the advantages
enjoyed by London over New York in international financial market
transactions. 108
As noted above, the Companies Act left company directors
responsible for disclosing relevant information for business reviews of the
long-term prospects of their firms. In doing so, the Act relied on a
principles-based standard of accounting based on “a fair review of the
company’s businesses” while referencing the crucial issues to be
considered. 109 It did not provide an explicit definition of the nature and
scope of proper reporting on those issues. For some commentators,
Parliament had neither the time nor the expertise to define the nature and
scope of the implied reporting standards introduced through the legislation.
Observers of the legislative campaign in the House of Lords suggest that
the Commons’ deliberations on the Bill were at best perfunctory, at worst
uninformed. 110 Equally, the Chancellor’s political sensitivity to claims
107. See Cristie L. Ford, New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-Based Securities
Regulation, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 1-2 (2008) (discussing the recent advantages realized by the
U.K. with regard to international IPO’s because of its “principles-based” approach to
securities regulation).
108. See Coffee, supra note 43. Competition between financial centers for global
position is a vital ingredient in debate over nation-state financial regulation. See Dariusz
Wójcik, Geography and the Future of Stock Exchanges: Between Real and Virtual Space,
38 GROWTH & CHANGE 200, 218-19 (2007). In their assessments of the declining
significance of Wall Street in relation to London both the Committee on Capital Markets
Regulation (2007) and the Bloomberg and Schumer report suggested that one cause of this
decline was to be found in the costs of U.S. securities regulation and especially the U.S.
preference for detailed rules and regulations over principles. See generally MICHAEL R.
BLOOMBERG & CHARLES E. SCHUMER, SUSTAINING NEW YORK’S AND THE US’ GLOBAL
FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP (2007). This issue has re-emerged with the debate over
the proper U.S. regulatory response to the sub-prime credit crisis; for some, the crisis was
the result of banks and financial institutions circumventing the rules regarding capital
adequacy and the like. By some accounts, a principles approach would have dampened such
behavior putting the onus on the institutions to show that their investment practices were
consistent with the intentions of regulators.
109. Companies Act 2006, § 417, cl. 3.
110. There is a certain irony in the capacity and willingness of the House of Lords to
engage in the substantive issues of legislation (compared to their colleagues in the
Commons). Since being elected in 1997, the Labor Government has sought to establish the
primacy of the lower House by reforming the Lords. However, by excluding hereditary
peers and by the appointment process, the Lords has become a chamber more than able to
challenge the government of the day. See generally ANTHONY KING, THE BRITISH
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about the costs of over-burdening corporate reporting narrowed the nature
and scope of mandated reporting. As a consequence and not withstanding
attention to the environment and employee circumstances in debate over
passage of the Reform Bill, company directors were deemed responsible
for determining the weight and significance (if any) to be attributed to these
issues. It could be argued, moreover, that the Government pulled back
from providing explicit rules on CESR disclosure requirements in a manner
consistent with the principles-based approach to accounting favored in the
U.K. and EU. Indeed, in the absence of a principles-based approach it is
likely that there would be no information disclosure on CESR risks and
long-term uncertainties facing a company, as is the case in the U.S. The
U.S. financial reporting regulation has shied away from the U.K.
principles-based approach to accounting standards and a fair review
override in preference to rule-based accounting which provides explicit
guidance on what companies are required to report. 111 In a 2003 U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) report, the SEC considered
amending this approach in favor of an objectives oriented standard
approach. 112 The Report argued in favor of standards framed in terms of an
accounting objective “at an appropriate level of specificity” with “an
appropriate amount of implementation guidance.” 113 This debate remains
unresolved in the U.S. Indeed, the reluctance of the SEC and Financial
Accounting Standards Board to implement principles-based accounting
standards may account for the lack of CESR reporting in the US, and will
continue until clearer financial metrics are developed to analyze CESR
information.
As a consequence, firms specializing in legal services, accounting and
audit functions, and directors’ training and compliance have entered the
market to provide advice on reporting according to the Companies Act and
its provisions. Service companies have relied, in part, upon professional
bodies to supply guidelines on compliance in the absence of detailed
Government rules and regulations and legal precedents that might provide
authoritative interpretations. Similarly, a range of NGOs have come to the
burgeoning market for corporate advice and third-party certification,
moving from public opinion with respect to the proper scope of CESR to
providing fee-based advisory services. Not surprisingly, the larger
advisory companies have employed CESR specialists from the NGO sector
CONSTITUTION (2007) (noting the recent history of British constitutional life).
111. See David Alexander, Globalisation of Accounting Standards: A UK Perspective,
in GLOBALISATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS 58-61 (Jayne M. Godfrey & Keryn
Chalmers eds, 2007).
112. SEC, Study Pursuant to Section 108(d) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 on the
Adoption by the United States Financial Reporting System of a Principles-Based Accounting
System (2003).
113. Id. at Executive Summary.
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and universities just as many of the larger FTSE-listed corporations have
come to employ in-house CESR specialists with responsibility to build the
information databases consistent with directors’ newfound disclosure
obligations. Armed with CESR information, disclosure has become, an
important element of corporations’ reputation management programs in the
media and elsewhere. 114
Notwithstanding the boost to fee-based advisory services brought by
the disclosure requirements of the Companies Act, it would seem that
directors’ compliance with the Act may remain specific to each company
until ‘best-practice’ standards of reporting are established. By contrast,
institutional investors demand standardized disclosure of market-sensitive
information such that data are comparable between companies (especially
those in the same industries and countries), consistent in definition and
measurement over time, and comprehensive in nature and scope. Further,
with the importance of real-time data providers such as Bloomberg,
Reuters, and Thomson it is also apparent that institutional investors demand
immediate access to this type of data directly from trading desks. Datamining and the stress-testing of causal relationships with regard to
corporate characteristics and stock-price movements have become essential
to investment practice, whatever the past significance attributed to the
efficient markets hypothesis. 115 See, for example, the success of the
Gompers et al. test and its variants on the significance of companies’
quality of corporate governance for stock value. 116
Absent U.K. government rules and regulations governing the
disclosure of market-sensitive data on the long-term prospects of
companies, market intermediaries have sought to supply standards and
data. One of the most important providers of disclosure standards with
respect to corporate balance sheets and the related data that flows through
global financial markets is the London-based International Accounting
Standards Board (“IASB”). However, the IASB has lagged behind EU and
U.K. legislation on developing standards and metrics for these types of
issues. 117 Independent of government and based upon independent

114. See Clark & Hebb, supra note 4, at 2023-24 (discussing the importance of
disclosure in maintaining, or disrupting, a corporation’s reputation).
115. See Gordon L. Clark et al., Institutional Investors and the Language of Finance:
The Global Metrics of Market Performance, in GLOBALISATION OF ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS, supra note 111, at 15 (discussing global harmonization of language used in
global accounting standards).
116. Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON.
107, 144-145 (2003).
117. Note, however, that the U.K. Accounting Standards Board (2006) has sought to
influence the reporting of items subject to the “business review” sections of the Companies
Act with a set of recommendations reflecting what they contend to be “best-practice.”
Lacking statutory force, as was to be the case through the OFR, these recommendations
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expertise, the IASB is responsible for formulating and articulating
corporate reporting standards consistent with the effective flow of marketsensitive information to global financial markets. Presumably, if the IASB
were to introduce related standards it would neither allow directors’
discretion as to the significance attributed to such standards, nor would it
allow directors the option to select “relevant” data or information. The
IASB, like other accounting standard boards around the world, mandates
both the use of promulgated standards and the nature and scope of
information to be disclosed. 118
In the space provided by the Companies Act, and the lack of
engagement on these issues by the accounting standards boards,
intermediaries have come to market with their own “standards” and
products to match. As such, the absence of standard-setting by the
Government on this issue is arguably a deliberate experiment in marketvolunteerism. It is an attempt to let market agents digest the large volume
of financial and non-financial information entering the marketplace so that
it might pre-empt what CESR issues are regarded as important drivers for
long-term sustainable economic growth. It would subsequently fall to
governments to crystallize these market-based models in more traditional
regulatory standards. 119
Historically, of course, agencies like Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and
Fitch have provided company-specific single-score alphanumeric credit
ratings to the market, allowing investors to evaluate in a comparable,
consistent and comprehensive manner the market value of proffered debt.
These companies use similar methods of assessment to come to their
scores, matched by some of the more recent market entrants that offer
specialized ratings on, for example, the nature and quality of corporate
governance. As is well-appreciated, however, the mainstream ratings
companies have not fared well in the aftermath of the 1990s tech bubble
and the more recent subprime global credit crisis. Their methods of
assessment and calibration of underlying credit risks have been subject to
harsh criticism. 120 Mainstream rating companies have remained aloof from

have not set industry standards.
118. See Alexander, supra note 111, at 60-61.
119. Presumably the Government will introduce such a standard once the metrics are
clearer, and the private sector has “test-run” what the standard needs to include (so that
investment companies can build their metrics in common agreement). See, for example,
recent debate (early 2008) in the House of Lords over the Climate Change Bill where a
proposed amendment would provide “guidance” on company reporting as to greenhouse
emissions.
120. There have been recent discussions in Europe and the U.S. on how to better regulate
credit rating agencies and their methodologies. See Trade Union Advisory Comm. to the
Org. for Econ. Cooperation and Dev., Trade Union Advisory Committee, Financialisation
and the “Sub-Prime” Financial Crisis—Issues for Future Regulation (Sept. 5, 2007)
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the calibration of CESR related issues, preferring, perhaps, to monitor the
development of standards and data in this area before acquiring (at some
time in the future) the market innovators.
We can distinguish between two generic approaches taken by
intermediaries in the development of CESR standards and performance
data. There are, as noted above, firms that begin with a comprehensive
array of variables designed to capture the crucial issues relevant to CESR
factors. Beginning with company annual reports and websites, these firms
interview companies to augment their initial assessments. From there they
develop qualitative scores to indicate corporate responsiveness to the issues
as well as their actual performance benchmarked against industry and
country averages. The resulting scores across a number of indicators
relevant to institutional investors rely upon directors’ disclosure and the
evaluation of collected data. In effect, these types of intermediaries seek to
capture current performance against relevant standards and supply to the
market their assessments of companies’ likely future performance. For
example, when assessing companies’ environmental performance, ratings
firms must determine the relevant issues, the indicator variables, and the
extent to which the assessed companies could be said to be above or below
the relevant benchmark. 121
Instead of relying upon corporate disclosure and the willingness of
corporations to be interviewed and assessed, a new generation of
intermediaries have sought to develop quantitative estimates of corporate
CESR ‘liability’ over a range of crucial variables relevant to corporations’
long-term financial performance. 122 Here, the intention is plain: to avoid
the complications and costs involved in site-visits and qualitative ratings by
building comprehensive and consistent databases on individual firms
benchmarked against industry averages. Intermediaries rely heavily upon
the public disclosure by corporations of their liabilities, augmented by
stylized models of whole industries. In effect, these models seek to map
the nature and scope of industry-specific systems of production and
distribution being a means of referencing firms according to their relative
performance. Based on this procedure, industry analysts can build stories
of likely long-term environmental performance, innovation, and
technological change. Analysts can identify firms that might be included,
for example, in “best-in-class” sectorally-diverse investment portfolios.

(proposing issues that should be discussed with regard to the proper reaction by financial
authorities).
121. James Salo, Corporate Governance and Environmental Performance, (Sch. of
Geography & the Env’t, Oxford Univ., Working Paper No. 05-11, 2005).
122. Abagail McWilliams & Donald Siegel, Corporate Social Responsibility and
Financial Performance: Correlation or Misspecification?, 21 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 603,
603-604 (2000).
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Reference to corporate CESR ‘liabilities’ here should be qualified by
the fact that, in most cases, these quantitative metrics are measuring a
company’s exposure to financial costs in the event that regulation is
implemented to price CESR externalities, rather than measuring a
company’s exposure to financial costs in relation to existing regulated
liabilities or costs. In the context of emerging legal regimes to price carbon
and other environmental outputs from industry, these quantitative metrics
are helpful in anticipating firms’ future cash flow risks should markets and
regulations apply more exacting pricing regimes. However, since these
projections are long-term, they are inevitably subject to uncertainty about
both the future regulatory landscape as well as the future CESR
performance of the firm.
Nevertheless, these quantitative estimates of companies’ actual and
disclosed liabilities, and their expected rates of change over time, can be
very important for analysts seeking to build predictive models of stock
price movements. 123 Equally, quantitative estimates allow for rapid and
systematic data sorting and comparison. For example, a single carbonestimate may be sufficient for investment analysts to rank-order traded
firms by industry, by country, and by market indices. By stripping out the
judgment associated with qualitative scores, as well as the problems
sometimes encountered when attempting to understand assessors’
judgments and benchmarks, these types of intermediaries supply to the
market data in much the same form that analysts encounter in their day-today trading. 124 These intermediaries are also clearly distinct from social
activists, whose agenda is differently focused on the roles and
responsibilities of the firm, and can therefore be distinguished from
conventional CSR discourse in which the social and environmental
interests of external stakeholders are a more dominant concern. 125
B.

A New Kind of Regulatory Strategy

The U.K. government’s willingness to stand back and let financial
intermediaries compete for the development of tools which adequately
price the market value of CESR information is not only a uniquely
shareholder-oriented approach to CESR, but also represents a unique type
123. See Benjamin J. Richardson, Pensions Law Reform and Environmental Policy: A
New Role for Institutional Investors 4(5) J. INT’L. FIN. MARKETS 159, 167 (2002) (discussing
socially responsible investment).
124. See, e.g., Trucost Methodology Overview, http://www.trucost.com//
howtrucostanalyses.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008) (discussing the Trucost assessment
methodology, which is one of the most important intermediaries in the London market for
environmental accounting).
125. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 1 (discussing the empirical results of the
“‘corporate social responsibility’ movement”).
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of regulatory strategy. Information-based regulatory strategies are not new
to the field of corporate social responsibility. However, it is widely
contested whether information-based strategies are truly “regulatory” in the
command and control sense, or closer to a form of new governance in
which firms (or other market actors) are merely “influenced” but are
ultimately free to act of their own accord. 126 New governance theory
argues that the CSR movement may more closely represent the latter.
Under this characterization of the CSR movement, information disclosure
is often used by corporations as a kind of public relations charade rather
than a way of regulating corporate behavior. 127 New governance theory
describes a “post-regulatory state” in which corporate behavior is
transformed through interactions between various actors—other firms
NGOs, government, and actors. Therefore, compared to regulatory
mechanisms like mandatory information disclosure, highly networked
communities are more influential in changing corporate behavior. 128
Reflexive law theorists, however, adopt a slightly different approach.
They acknowledge the role of various stakeholders in actively changing
corporate behavior but argue that verifiable and comprehensive information
disclosure is crucial to catalyzing this change. They argue that reliable
mandatory reporting on, for example, corporate environmental
performance, is important for stakeholder activism to have any real
influence. 129
We argue that the corporate disclosure regime within the Companies
Act is best described as a hybrid policy instrument which combines both
command and control regulation and market-based mechanisms. 130 The
control mechanism of the regime is the mandatory disclosure
requirement. 131 Although the absence of reporting standards weakens the
126. See Karen Yeung, Government By Publicity Management: Sunlight or Spin, PUB.
L. 360, 362 (2005) (discussing whether public communication management of government
information really enhance transparency and accountability). A recent interesting example
of this debate is the EU REACH regulation on chemicals production and trade. In this case,
the disclosure of information has been a pre-condition to the existence of the market because
chemicals producers are prevented from entering the market until they have disclosed the
information on the chemicals’ properties, risks, and methods of safe use, among other pieces
of information. See Liz Fisher, The Perfect Storm of REACH: Charting Regulatory
Controversy In the Age of Information, Sustainable Development, and Globalization, 11 J.
RISK RES. 541, 541 (2008).
127. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 23 (noting that the corporate social
responsibility movement “may invite insincerity”).
128. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Global Government Networks, Global Information
Agencies, and Disaggregated Democracy, 24 MICH J. INT’L L. 1041, 1057 (2003).
129. See Richardson, supra note 123, at 167 (discussing the importance of mandating
reliable reporting in order for the information to be useful to investors).
130. See Yeung, supra note 126, at 362.
131. See ANTHONY OGUS, REGULATION: LEGAL FORM AND ECONOMIC THEORY 126-44
(1994) (describing mandatory information disclosures).
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substance of the “command” directed towards firms, the competition
amongst financial intermediaries in London to interpret the disclosed data
distinguishes the Companies Act from other disclosure regimes with
weaker enforcement mechanisms. 132 Whereas the effectiveness of some
mandatory disclosure regimes (for example, product labeling) are limited
by the ability of informed consumers to accurately interpret the disclosed
information, the Government has sought to leverage the power of London’s
finance sector and market-price incentives to guarantee the quantity and
quality of information to be disclosed. In this way, the market acts as an
effective ‘enforcer’ of the disclosure provisions because financial
intermediaries are closely scrutinizing information and putting pressure on
firms to make the information reliable and relevant.
The market-based mechanism used in the disclosure provisions is also
unusual because the intention behind the provisions, as we have discussed,
is to enhance shareholders’ understanding of the business risks facing
quoted stocks and improve competitive market pricing of these stocks. In
terms of regulatory theory, this logic relies on consensual regulatory
theory: a form of regulation which encourages participants to cooperate
with each other. In this case, the company, investors, and financial
consultants are brought into close contact on the issue of CESR information
and are encouraged to agree on what information is relevant to the longterm financial prospects of a particular company. 133 This type of regulation
is therefore different from CSR disclosure regimes where the incentive to
provide information is usually ethical rather than financial, and where some
firms may be prone to exaggerate their CSR credentials without any direct
repercussions. 134
It is important to emphasize, then, that the Companies Act appears to
move beyond the conventional characteristics of the CSR movement and
integrates CESR information within a theory of efficient market operation
rather than simply ethical and social responsibility. Unlike the CSR
movement where the role of all stakeholders is prominent, the Government
has given prominence to investors while simultaneously satisfying the
interests of the NGOs and social activists. The goal of financial markets
under the efficient market hypothesis is for quoted stock prices to fully
reflect all the information available on the firm. 135 Ideally, market prices
132. Gordon L. Clark, London in the European Financial Services Industry: Locational
Advantage and Product Complementarities, 2 J. ECON GEOGRAPHY 433, 433 (2002).
133. See BRONWEN MORGAN & KAREN YEUNG, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND
REGULATION: TEXT AND MATERIALS 316-18 (2007).
134. See Conley & Williams, supra note 49, at 57 (noting that the corporate social
responsibility movement is motivated by ethical concerns).
135. See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical
Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (discussing the “theoretical and empirical literature on the
efficient markets model,” which occurs when prices fully reflect available information).
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respond to new information quickly and accurately once the information is
disclosed. However, where markets have not been given the opportunity to
price financially material information because it has not been made
available, then financial markets are exposed to the savage shocks such as
we have seen in the subprime-led global credit crisis, and what we may
expect to see if the physical consequences of climate change take place as
predicted.
The Government’s disclosure regime is an attempt to encourage
financial intermediaries to price this information accurately and efficiently.
The regime negotiates a complex balance. On the one hand, it explicitly
acknowledges that CESR information is financially material and that it
needs to be priced in order for markets to be informationally efficient. On
the other hand, it acknowledges that, to date, the efficient markets
hypothesis has failed for two reasons. First, investors have not had access
to reliable CESR information. Second, they have lacked a common metric
to accurately analyze this information. Since financial markets have failed
to price CESR information to date, the Government appears to be
intervening to assist investors in pricing CESR risks over the long term.
By developing a complex regulatory regime which gives financial
intermediaries an incentive to fill this gap, the Government acts as a
regulator of information disclosure on both environmental and social
matters, as well as a protector of the integrity of the quoted stock price of
traded securities. 136
The disclosure regime also addresses the assumption under the
efficient markets hypothesis that sharp-eyed arbitrageurs are able to rapidly
move prices after the announcement of market-sensitive information.
Although this may be true for some types of information (for example,
mergers and acquisitions, dividend announcements, and so forth), arbitrage
opportunities are limited in instances where information is expensive to
The Government has implicitly
acquire, verify, and process. 137
acknowledged that CESR is an example of “expensive” information
because CESR information has conventionally been of unreliable quality
and difficult to measure in terms of financial materiality. The U.K.’s
disclosure provisions are an attempt to overcome this hurdle because the
onus is on directors to interpret what information is “essential” to the
business and to report on trends and factors which are likely to affect the

136. See John R. Graham et al., Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions,
62 FIN. ANALYSTS J. 27, 27-28 (2006) (discussing other reporting factors which diminish the
integrity of market pricing).
137. See Nicholas Barberis & Richard Thaler, A Survey of Behavioral Finance, in 1B
HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF FINANCE 1059-60 (George M. Constantinides et al., eds.,
2003) (explaining that substantial costs are associated with the discovery and exploitation of
mis-pricings, and that returns on such an investment may be almost impossible to predict).
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future development, performance and position of the business. In this way,
the CESR information, which is to be disclosed under the Companies Act,
is intended to be crucial to a firm’s business operations. 138
The approach under the Companies Act is characteristic of AngloAmerican shareholder capitalism because it empowers small investors and
“outsiders” who do not share the privileged “insider” relationships that
stakeholders in continental Europe might enjoy with top-level
management. 139 This approach also empowers small investors in relation
to institutional investors, since the latter usually have superior dataprocessing technology and organizational capacity to digest and analyze
this information. 140 This may be intentional, since institutional investors,
who own seventy percent of all listed equities in the U.K., have been slow
to respond to CESR issues. This may be, in part, explained by the paucity
of quantifiable metrics to analyze CESR data which has meant that
institutional investors have been cautious of CESR information. It remains
to be seen whether financial intermediaries will be able to develop metrics
that are sufficiently rigorous for institutional investors to change their tune
on this issue.
Finally, it should be noted that the Companies Act disclosure regime
should be distinguished from other information-based policies because it
places the obligation to report on directors (through the annual business
review), rather than on the company at large, as is common in public
relations-driven CESR. By pinning disclosure obligations on directors in
conjunction with amendments to directors’ duties discussed above, the
Government is demonstrating a prescient understanding of corporate
behavioral change.
In agreement with reflexive legal theorists,
Gunningham et al. have argued that the attitudes and style of top-level
management are highly correlated with firms’ environmental behavior
compared with other variables such as jurisdiction, size, or annual
turnover. 141 In addition, managers and shareholders can exert greater
138. This is another instance in which the disclosure regime under the Companies Act
(2006) moves beyond conventional CSR drivers, where a company’s CESR activities rarely
include their “core” activities.
139. High levels of information transparency on CESR are also consistent with the EU’s
strategy of building more integrated and competitive capital markets across Europe. Under
a closed market structure a premium is placed on special relationships between ‘insiders’
and the firm. These relationships facilitate the flow of private information, which is fully
digested before being released to the market. However, the fair review accounting
principles of the EU Modernization Directive as discussed are attempts to build greater
harmonization of markets around transparent and well-informed markets.
140. See Qi Chen, Discussion of Which Institutional Investors Trade Based on Private
Information About Earnings and Returns? 45 J. ACCT. RES. 323, 323 (2007) (discussing
possible explanations, including varied power levels, for differences between institutions
that trade on private information and those that do not).
141. NEIL GUNNINGHAM ET. AL, SHADES OF GREEN: BUSINESS, REGULATION, AND
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change on firm-wide behaviors in the Anglo-American firm, compared
with NGOs and the public. 142 In this respect, the Government’s decision to
place the business-review reporting obligation on directors may be an
effective way to engage high-level managers and directors within the firm.
V.

IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS

The premise of this paper is that the modern corporation is both the
object of investment for the global financial sector and the source of value
for society. As the object of investment, the modern corporation is subject
to the theories and practices of the investment industry being, more often
than not, just one element amongst many in market-based portfolios. Its
“value,” in this respect, is contextual: it is priced against market
information concerning its expected value relying upon common metrics
and comparative market performance. As such, the modern corporation
has no intrinsic value—whether investors hold, or do not hold, a
corporation in their stock portfolios depends upon their overall desired riskadjusted rate of return. We recognize, of course, that this is characteristic
of Anglo-American economies wherein the financial sector has become
virtually autonomous from the so-called “real” economy. 143 But it is
increasingly the case for continental European economies, and especially
their largest traded corporations that seek the benefits of global financial
markets. 144
At another level, the modern corporation is the principal source of
value for society. Obviously, it provides employment and earned income
as well as tax revenue for governments. In many countries, its share of
national income has grown dramatically over the past fifty years—so much
so that the “partnership” between the state and the corporation, so
important for post-war politics and policy, has been heavily discounted.
For many, this is the ‘normal’ state of affairs. But this has meant that the
modern corporation carries two rather different sets of expectations: as the
means of generating income for distribution through society, and as the
medium through which social expectations are to be, in part, realized. We
noted the tension between these expectations, arguing that the Companies
ENVIRONMENT 68 (2003).
142. Ruth V. Aguilera et al., Putting the S Back in Corporate Social Responsibility: A
Multilevel Theory of Social Change in Organizations, 32 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 836, 836
(2007) (arguing that the varied motives of NGOs and corporations lead to variations in ways
that each are effective in increasing corporate social responsibility).
143. See FRANKLIN ALLEN & DOUGLAS GALE, UNDERSTANDING FINANCIAL CRISIS 50
(2007).
144. See Rob Bauer et. al, supra note 3 at 461-65 (arguing that increasing adoption of
shareholder-friendly Anglo-American corporate practices by continental companies will
allow European corporate governance to substitute for government regulation).
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Act was conceived to enhance the global competitiveness of U.K.-listed
corporations given EU and domestic debate over the proper purpose of the
corporation with respect to social and environmental standards. When
pressed to explain its preference, the U.K. Labor Government favored the
former over the latter.
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the Government, market analysts, and
social activists have joined together in an uneasy alliance to promote
greater disclosure of information to a broad array of constituents. The
disclosure movement has been driven by financial market agents concerned
to better price, on a comparative basis, one company over others. This
claim for the disclosure of market-sensitive information has proven
extremely powerful, buttressed by theories of market efficiency and related
notions of market equitability wherein “insiders” and “outsiders” are
deemed deserving of access to the same information. 145 If it appears as an
unassailable economic good, the disclosure movement is also a means to an
end wherein the autonomy of corporate executives is brought to account on
the assumption that disclosure can discipline hubris and a penchant for
empire-building. 146 For continental Europe, of course, the disclosure
movement is part of a larger process whereby hitherto sheltered national
champions have been integrated into the global financial community.
For the EU, concerned about the social responsibility of the modern
corporation, the interest of financial agents in disclosure has been an
opportunity to articulate a broad range of items for disclosure while
advocating standards by which the quantity and quality of information are
to be judged. The EU Modernisation Directive sought to combine both in a
way that would meet the interests of the social partners or stakeholders in
an expansive definition of corporate responsibility. The U.K. embraced the
opportunity to re-write U.K. company law but with a particular flavor
(captured in our recounting of the parliamentary debate over its passage
through the House of Lords). The U.K. Government introduced the
principle that company directors ought to disclosure market-relevant
information on the long-term prospects of the firm, including, where
relevant, reference to social and environmental matters. This was hardly a
ringing endorsement of corporate social responsibility; the Government
sought at every opportunity to narrow the scope of such a requirement to
that which would be appropriate for market valuation of company
prospects.
In effect, the Government passed on the opportunity to embrace
continental European social democracy. In doing so, it reinforced its
145. See WILHELM & DOWNING, supra note 16, at 107, 137 (providing an analytic
framework for examining the effects of evolving information technology on financial
markets).
146. See Bauer et al., supra note 3, at 442.
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apparent commitment to the competitiveness of U.K. financial markets and
especially London’s place in the global competition for incorporation,
cross-listing, and international financial transactions. The Government’s
reluctance to set reporting standards on certain matters including social and
environmental issues has prompted rapid growth in market-based solutions
to these questions. We have argued that in the absence of government
reporting standards, financial intermediaries have sought to provide
measures to the extent that financial agents require consistent, comparative
and comprehensive metrics for assessing corporate value. There has been a
remarkable burst of private investment in metric-making, some of which
rely upon qualitative judgment, others of which are entirely quantitative in
the manner made popular by the real-time data streams that flow across the
trading desks of major financial institutions. Once again, metric-making
has advantaged London as one of just a few truly global centers of financial
innovation. 147
Not surprisingly, metric-making has brought into being remarkable
coalitions of interest and institutions linking the NGO community with
banks, venture capital partnerships and pension funds. If stymied by the
Chancellor’s repudiation of the OFR, through the Companies Act, the NGO
community has found a willing audience in segments of the financial
industry (if not always the corporate sector). But at this juncture we
emphasized that metric-making is a supply-side activity—it is all about
articulating standards and measures of measurement for the investment
industry on the assumption that the demand for such metrics will follow the
lead provided by statute. Whether this will actually occur remains to be
seen. The Government has embarked on a remarkable experiment in
reflexive “regulation,” eschewing political leadership in the hope that the
social expectations of activists will be taken up through the interests of
financial agents in pricing the value of major companies.
However, the interest of pension funds and institutional investors in
CESR metrics remains cautious given the regulatory history in this area in
the UK. We noted, for example, that the UK Labor Government’s 1999
disclosure policy on ethical pension fund investment was still-born; it
failed, at a rudimentary level to encourage pension funds and their service
providers to engage in the issues. By contrast, the relevant provisions of
the Companies Act concerning the long-term prospects of firms are likely
to have far more important affects than the change in regulations to the
Pensions Act 1995. In any event, recent research has indicated that many
pension funds and their trustees have not made real efforts to match their
investment policies to community expectations as regards social and

147. See CLARK, supra note 24, at 170-95 (identifying London as prominent in the
world’s financial services industries).
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environmental matters. 148 In part, reluctance to engage CESR issues can be
explained by a narrow interpretation of fiduciary duty that excludes
reference to anything other than the risk-adjusted rate of return. Equally,
we have also shown that many trustees, especially those that are
experienced, recognize the complex nature of the issues involved and the
lack of widely-accepted decision-metrics relevant to investment strategy.
Too often, consideration of CESR issues is event-specific, undercutting the
strong interest of pension fund trustees in a well-governed investment
strategy.
In any event, many private sector pension funds are opposed to these
types of interventions in all but the most obvious cases. This is for two
reasons. First, private sector pension fund boards typically include senior
executives whose principal concerns are their own status and promotion in
the company (most important) and the solvency of the fund in relation to
corporate revenue and growth (very important). In the U.K., many funds
are staffed by “secretaries” who are company employees; deliberation over
investment strategy is often truncated and reliant upon consultants. In
effect, private pension funds have neither the interest nor the capacity to
engage with the issues. At best, pension fund boards are likely to follow
the lead on social and environmental matters provided by highly reputable
investment houses whose investment products integrate these matters into
the expected pricing of offered portfolios. Alternatively, a demonstrated
link between risk and return and environmental liabilities and management
capacity may attract the interest of boards; at the margin, unless held by
government to account for such decisions, pension boards may simply
ignore the issues.
By our interpretation, the U.K. Companies Act 2006 provides a
political recipe for reconciling two competing interests in the value of the
modern corporation. Where the Government might have required certain
reporting standards and where it might have introduced mandatory
disclosure on significant social and environmental concerns, the
Government sought to enhance the competitiveness of London’s financial
markets in relation to Frankfurt and Wall Street. In this respect, the
Government underwrote the prospects for market-intermediation rather
than directly regulating corporate social and environmental responsibility.
We have already witnessed the devastating effect which poor disclosure
regulation can have of global capital markets in the form of the subprime
global credit crisis. Let us hope that the strategy embedded in the UK
148. See Emiko Caerlewy-Smith et al., Agitation, Resistance, and Reconciliation with
Respect to Socially Responsible Investment: The Attitudes of UK Pension Trustees and
Oxford Undergraduates, 38 ENV’T & PLANNING 1585, 1585 (2006) (illustrating an example
of divergence between pension-fund managers’ policies and the expectations of a
community they serve).
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Companies Act will assist in mitigating similar shocks in the future.

